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By Terry

Nardin. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1983. Pp. xii,

350. Cloth, $35; paper $14.50.
This unusual book is at once an attempt to revise and refine the
nineteenth-century conception of international relations and an argument for its moral superiority to some prominent recent theories of the
international system. Professor Nardin, an associate professor of
political science at the State University of New York in Buffalo, claims
that the statements of shared purposes in the United Nations Charter
and in the programs of movements like the New International Economic Order misstate the basis for international association and
misapprehend the nature of moral conduct in international affairs.
Professor Nardin's argument falls short in several respects and his
tone is occasionally a bit strident, but this spirited defense of a controversial position should stimulate discussion among theorists of international law and jurisprudence.
Nardin begins by positing a distinction between "purposive" and
"practical" associations of states. Purposive associations exist to further shared goals or ends: the abolitionist movement in America was
an example of a purposive association of individuals dedicated to ending slavery. Practical associations, on the other hand, are based on
rules or practices that are "proper to be observed in acting, regardless
of one's end" (p. 8). One example of a practical association might be a
debating society, in which the members may not share any political
goals but are willing to follow common rules of debate.
Nardin argues that international society is emphatically the latter
kind of association, a practical association of states based on a few
shared rules and practices. It is "an association of independent and
diverse political communities, each devoted to its own ends and its
own conception of the good, often related to one another by nothing
more than the fragile ties of a common tradition of diplomacy" (p. 19).
He rejects the idea that states associate with other states in order to
further goals of world peace or economic justice, arguing that such a
notion is logically incomplete, historically inaccurate, and morally
questionable.
Nardin's argument from logic is not very satisfying. For Nardin,
the purposive conception of international society is logically incomplete because its proponents "forget that any international agreement
presupposes commonly acknowledged rules and procedures according
to which agreements can be made" (p. 24). 1 The idea here is that no
1. This classic formalist argument appears in different guises again and again in the book.
See, e.g., p. 172 ("Pacta sunt servanda is a rule of customary international law and not itself the
product of explicit agreement, for if it were one would have to ask why the agreement to respect
agreements should itself be respected."); p. 194 ("The view that there is no law apart from what
officials decide is indeed self-contradictory, for the very idea of an official presupposes rules ac-
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association can be purely purposive: some kind of practical association, some set of rules independent of the common goals and accepted
by all, must lie behind a purposive association if it is to act at all. Even
an anarchists' convention needs procedural laws, or else no one can
say when the group has agreed. Yet this does not prove that international society is not purposive - just that it must be practical as well.
Nardin's developed theory of the practical association of states must
go beyond this weak formalism.
Professor Nardin's historical and political argument is stronger:
the "practical" conception of international society can better account
for the actual diversity of ends in the world and can generally provide
a more satisfactory explanation of international law. His analysis of
the history of international relations is perhaps the most interesting
and valuable section in the book. Nardin combines intellectual and
social history by exploring the tension between practical and purposive
conceptions of international law both in the theories of Kant and Bentham and in the actual workings of nineteenth-century and twentiethcentury international organizations. His treatment of the Concert of
Europe (pp. 86-97) is particularly good. Historians have viewed the
Concert as both an instrument of collective interests and as a set of
practices designed to achieve security and stability among nineteenthcentury European states regardless of their individual goals. The early
congresses of the Concert can be seen as purposive efforts to advance
the shared goal of monarchical rule, but they were also practical efforts to presei;ve the European states system by promoting legitimate
monarchy in most - but not all2 - countries. Nardin suggests that
the Concert maintained an essentially practical character even late in
its history, when theories of world community and shared goals were
on the rise. He states that, "although it was colored by successive versions of the view that it existed to promote the shared purposes of its
members, it never entirely shed its character as a forum for setting
limits to the conduct of sovereign powers whose national pride, preoccupation with security, and competitive rivalry stood as evidence of
their divergent purposes" (p. 96). This descriptive passage seems close
to Nardin's idea of what an important international organization
should be.
Nardin's treatment of the League of Nations and the United Nations is more problematic, and his rather surprising conclusion that
the United Nations represents a more radical departure from traditional forms of international relations than does the League relies too
much on a very formal reading of the United Nations Charter.
cording to which public offices are created, their lawful incumbents identified, and the scope of
their jurisdiction delimited.").
2. Nardin notes that the rights of nonmonarchical states like the Swiss Republic were pro·
tected as well. See p. 89.
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Nardin writes that the United Nations "is really an attempt to establish a new regime in which states, associated on the basis of an agreement to pursue together certain specified substantive ends, will follow
the directives of the body that is set up to organize the pursuit of these
ends" (p. 107). Nardin may be right that such an attempt was made;
five Secretaries-General would agree that it did not succeed.
The heart of Nardin's book is his attempt to show that the practical conception of international society is compatible with traditional
theories of international law. First, Nardin seeks to establish that international law is law, arguing that legislation, enforcement, and a
common judge are only contingent features of law and that their apparent absence in the international system does not negate the existence or obligatory nature of international law. Yet Nardin's
treatment of the problem of enforcement is disturbingly casual:
First, we must dispose of what is now generally agreed to be the most
egregious error made by Austin concerning the relation between enforcement and law. . . . That one agent is able by force to compel another to
act in a certain manner can hardly mean the first has right to demand
such conduct, nor can it mean that the second has a duty or obligation to
comply. . . . Coercion alone cannot create rights or obligations of any
sort, legal or nonlegal. On the contrary, enforcement presupposes the
validity of the law that is enforced. 3

This is unpersuasive. It is not quite so clear that Austin was wrong
that law must carry sanctions to be law, and Nardin's argument does
not inspire confidence. Austin could reply that any sense of obligation
to obey the law other than fear of sanction is a contingent feature of
law, and that coercion does oblige a person to obey if she wishes to
avoid the sanction. That is, law need not be morally binding to be
considered "law." In any case, Nardin's argument that enforcement is
not a sufficient condition for law - "Coercion alone cannot create
rights" (p. 126) - does not prove that enforcement is not a necessary
component.
Nardin next attempts to delimit the specific character of the international legal system. He argues that international law is largely customary law, created not intentionally but rather as "the indirect
consequence of innumerable and substantively motivated acts, decisions, and policies" (pp. 166-67). Empirical investigation and inductive reasoning are needed to determine whether a particular norm is a
valid international law: there is no "rule of recognition," in H.L.A.
Hart's terms. According to Nardin, "Customary international law
arises wherever there exists a general or uniform practice together
with the general acceptance of this practice as law" (p. 167).
There are two related problems with this conception of international law. First, Nardin does not explain how international legal
3. Pp. 125-26 (emphasis in original).
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rules change.4 Second, Nardin's model will not be very helpful to
someone who wants to predict whether particular acts of one country
are likely to be accompanied by strong sanctions, weak sanctions, or
no sanctions at all from the international community. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was followed not by superpower confrontation, but by the first stirrings of detente. The Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan had very different consequences, and Nardin's model cannot explain why.s
Nardin ends his book with an argument for the moral superiority
of the practical conception of international society. The fact that the
rules and practices of international law are limited in number and
scope allows the world's societies to remain diverse and encourages
self-determination. Yet surely other values are lost. A system of international law premised on the formal equality of states that aims only
to place a few restrictions on international conduct will do little to
overcome the dire poverty of the developing countries and little to
equalize the real power of nations. Perhaps it is unrealistic to suggest
that the countries of the world can engage in a purposive association
to bring about these changes, but Nardin comes uncomfortably close
to justifying the status quo.

4. Nardin writes:
The rules of customary international law are a distillation of the constantly changing practices of states, and they reflect the collective will of the international community only in the
sense that certain patterns of conduct from time to time attain a degree of acceptance sufficient for them to be acknowledged as a distinct practice entitled to govern future conduct.
P. 167. Nardin completely fails to explain how the changing practices of states attain this degree
of acceptance or why accepted practices fall into disrepute.
5. Both the problem of change and the likelihood of sanctions in the area of international
relations are treated with sophistication by Professor Myres S. McDougal and his colleagues at
the Yale Law School. See generally M. McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
(1960); Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication (1981) (April 24,
1981) (unpublished Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture).

